Rohit Dhankar
Public Reason
The idea of public reason in the current debates is mostly invoked in connection with political and moral issues which have political implications. It is considered necessary for democracy. This strong emphasis on its legitimate space only in political deliberations limits the scope, constituency, and content of public reason. Rawls limits it to the “constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice” (SEP), thereby not even covering the whole sphere of public relationships where citizens exercise power over each other. Similarly, the constituency (the group of people) covered by the Rawlsian idea are the “reasonable persons” (SEP). Reasonable persons are those who are “ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so. Those norms they view as reasonable for everyone to accept and therefore as justifiable to them; and they are ready to discuss the fair terms that others propose” (Rawls 1996, 49). Second, who “accept their consequences for the use of public reason in directing the legitimate exercise of political power in a constitutional regime” (Rawls 1996, 54). [Interestingly, the people involved in debates in Indian forums—be that the parliament, the legislatures of states, or the mass media—will almost all fail both Rawlsian criteria!]
The content of public reason, it seems, should include:
- Some basic political values like the idea of equal basic liberties; the idea of equality of opportunity.
- Guidelines of enquiry which should include principles of reasoning and rules of evidence to determine how substantive principles included in point one are to be applied. (SEP, Rawls)
According to a more inclusive view of constituency, based on Habermas’ view “the normative content of public reason is not something that is determined via philosophical analysis or argument. Rather, philosophy provides a set of ideal rules or guidelines for the conduct of public reasoning. The ideal guidelines for public reasoning would ensure that the discussion is inclusive, public, and free from any internal or external coercion,” and leave the normative content to be determined by the public reasoning itself.
In this view, selectively summarized from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, public reason is seen in a technical sense, primarily concerned with political discourse, and contains (a) some normative principles and (b) rules of public debate.
Ganeri’s formulation, though claimed to be based on Rawls’ idea and perhaps intended to remain in the political sphere, leaves inclusion of other areas at least in interpretation open. Ganeri states: “Public reason is the mode of deliberation that brings people of diverse philosophical, religious, and moral convictions into a state of rational accord with respect to a matter of mutual concern and common interest.” Let’s interpret “matter of mutual concern and common interest” in a wider sense inclusive of matters pertaining to truth, knowledge, morals, and good life, even when not directly connected with political issues. This view too will include both aspects of public reason, namely normative content and rules of debate. We will use “public reasoning” as the activity of exercising public reason.
Nyaya and Public Reasoning
Ganeri shows that Indian resources can enrich public reasoning globally, and uses several of his examples from Nyaya. Malcolm Keating favourably compares early Nyaya argumentation theory with the pragma-dialectics of dispassionate discourse, and claims that they both can not only support but enrich each other. My layman’s reading of Nyaya sutras and commentaries convinces me that the whole Nyaya philosophy is developed—though not entirely and in every respect—substantially as a philosophy of public reasoning. And it is of immense value in public reasoning of today, even after thousands of years of its formulation. I will give just a few examples from Nyaya to substantiate my claim.
1. The purpose itself claims so
The first Nyaya-sutra of Gautama enumerates 16 categories, the knowledge of which is claimed to be necessary to reach the highest good. Some people attack this enumeration as just an unconnected laundry list (asambandhita pralapa). Ganganatha Jha defends the list by stating the following:
“Before writing his treatise, Gautama thought that the best way of presenting the subject truthfully would be to imagine two persons, one as the proponent (vadi) and the other as the opponent (prativadi), and to have both sides set forth their arguments before a third, an imagined mediator; and then to have that imagined mediator arrive at a decision as to the real truth of the matter.” (A tentative translation from Nyayaprakash by Jha)
This clearly states Nyaya to be a shastra which can be best understood in a debate. Jha makes it imaginary; however, the details of each argument in Sutras and commentaries clearly indicate possibilities of actual public debate.
2. Five components of Anumana Pramana (inference)
Anumana seems to be the heart of Nyaya in many ways. The very term “Nyaya” is defined by Vatsyayana as “the examination of an object with the help of the instruments of valid knowledge (pramanas).” And the anumana pramana is called “parama-nyaya.” Explaining anumana Vatsyayana says:
“Each of the five propositions (namely pratijna, etc.) with which the desired thesis is conclusively established (siddhi is completed), is called an ‘inference component’ (avayava) in relation to their totality. The four pramanas are collectively present (i.e. underlie) in these five. The preliminary statement of the thesis (pratijna) is verbal testimony (agama). The reason (hetu) is inference (anumana). The exemplification (udaharana) is perception (pratyaksha). The application (upanaya) is comparison (upamana). The demonstration of the capability of all these to combine for the sake of establishing one central thesis is the conclusion (nigamana). Such is Nyaya par excellence.”
Two points in anumana are noteworthy in relation to public reasoning:
- It has two forms: swartha (for arriving at a conclusion by oneself) and parartha (for convincing others).
- Udaharana, as mentioned above, is an example that is acceptable to both the vadi and prativadi.
Without going into details it is enough to say here that the very structure of anumana, which is called parama-nyaya, is formulated for public reasoning with others in the presence of an audience and moderated by a madhyastha.
3. Samshaya (doubt), conclusion, and open-mindedness
Nyaya is supposed to operate neither in complete ignorance nor when a clear and valid judgment has been arrived at. It operates when there is some knowledge about an issue or thing but that knowledge is not certain—that is, there is doubt regarding its true nature. This means one has an open mind about ascertaining valid cognition about it and is open to discussion.
To remove doubt, vada (discussion to ascertain the truth) is recommended. “Final ascertainment (nirnaya) is the knowledge of truth (tattvajnana). It is the final result of (i.e. acquired through) the instruments of valid knowledge. Discussion for the final ascertainment (vada) ends with this.”
4. Vada, Jalpa, and Vitanda
The three forms of argumentation or debate are specifically enunciated for public reasoning.
- Vada is the form of debate in which the two contestants argue in favour of their respective points of view and criticise the opponent’s view with valid arguments without contradicting what is already accepted or established. The purpose is the ascertainment of truth.
- Jalpa (disputation) is a kind of vada in which disputants support their arguments by auxiliaries—chhala (futile rejoinder), jati (casuistry), and nigrahasthana (defeaters or clinchers). The purpose of debate here becomes victory by any means, in view of some Naiyayikas; while some others think of them as tools for safeguarding one’s position by replying in kind. This is not considered a good form of debate.
- Vitanda (wrangling) is when there is no counter-position to be established. The vitandika just tries to refute the position of the vadi, without having anything to say himself.
Phanibhushana gives the essential characteristics of the three forms of debate as: “Vada is a debate prompted by the desire for the attainment of right knowledge, Jalpa is a debate prompted by the desire for victory, and Vitanda is a debate prompted by the desire for victory where the opponent has no care for establishing any thesis of his own.”
These forms obviously indicate public debate. [Interestingly, present-day public reasoning in our beloved country has very little Vada, and is mainly occupied by Jalpa and Vitanda!]
5. Openness to questions
Nyaya, being a philosophical system, is naturally open to all kinds of questioning of its doctrines without any limit or declaring some questions as blasphemy. This is a natural tendency of all philosophy; I am mentioning it here only because in today’s India it may come as a surprise to some. Nyaya is part of the six systems that are often termed Hindu philosophy. As is well known, belief in the truth of the Vedas, existence of the soul (atma), and God (Ishwara) are part of entrenched Hindu religious belief. Nyaya allows questioning of all three and many more without any qualms.
In the discussion on testimony (or shabda-pramana) the sutrakara (Gautama) himself raises a question challenging its validity. In sutra 2.1.57 (in Jha 2.1.58): “[Objection] It [i.e. Veda] has no validity, because it is vitiated by falsehood (anrita), self-contradiction (vyaghata), and repetition (punarukti).” [I have deliberately taken Gangopadhyaya’s translation because he specifically mentions Veda. However, neither Gautama nor Vatsyayana mention Veda directly. But all commentators interpret this sutra as challenging the shabda-pramanya of Veda.]
Though Gautama rejects this objection in the very next sutra through a rather flimsy argument concerning the “imperfections of the ritual performance, of the performer, and of the means employed.” This, however, clearly seems to be a fig leaf. The point I am making is that the question itself is not silenced; rather, it is taken up and dealt with in a rational manner. Almost every contention in the sutras is examined from the counterpoint and hard questions are asked.
Importance in present-day context
One can multiply such examples on almost all claims of Nyaya. All this makes Nyaya almost a philosophy of public reasoning. A large part of public reasoning in the present-day world is conducted in mass media (print media, television, and social media). A careful study of what is going on will show that, as far as India is concerned, this is mostly Jalpa and Vitanda. The most common fallacies used are ad hominem and slippery slope. Pramanas (good arguments and evidence) are usually absent. Assertion is the mainstay of the attacks and counter-attacks. Understanding Nyaya principles and procedures of debate may be very fruitful in navigating through the present-day toxic discussions, and can immensely help in healthy public reasoning.
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Posted by Rohit Dhankar 
Thinking Aloud 